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ABSTRACT 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) gained notoriety for their role in the global financial 
crisis. In late 2011, the IRS proposed new regulations that would classify CDSs 
bought by someone who does not own the credit, known as “naked” CDSs, as 
“financial instruments” and thereby qualify them for the highly beneficial capital 
gains tax treatment. This classification is incorrect. 
Naked CDSs, which constitute about 80% or more of all CDSs, are not financial 
instruments at all. Rather, this article argues, they are gambling wagers—the 
winnings on which are taxable at the ordinary income tax rate. This is not the radical 
suggestion it may seem. In fact, Congress acknowledged that certain derivatives, 
including CDSs, might constitute gambling when it exempted them from “any State 
or local law that prohibits or regulates gaming.” While the exemption decriminalized 
Naked CDSs, it made no change to their tax status. 
Under existing law, this tax rate would apply to the winnings of hedge funds and 
hedge fund managers through their so-called carried interests. The 20% difference on 
perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars of income is highly significant to a financially 
strapped U.S. Treasury. In addition, as gambling income, Naked CDS winnings of 
hedge fund managers are subject to the 2.9% Medicare tax, and most Naked CDSs 
are also subject to a 2% federal excise tax on gambling. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
redit default swaps (CDSs), arcane “financial products” 
developed in the mid-1990s, are widely regarded as a significant 
contributing factor to the global financial crisis that followed barely a 
decade later.1 While disastrous for some participants,2 the CDS 
“market” was immensely profitable for others.3 
In August 2004, the IRS sought information in connection with 
requests from “taxpayers and industry groups” for guidance on the 
proper tax treatment for CDSs.4 After more than seven years of 
waiting, the IRS issued its proposed regulation.5 The fine print of the 
proposed regulation provides a tax giveaway that amounts to perhaps 
hundreds of billions of dollars to the very investment banks, hedge 
fund managers, and others that made vast fortunes helping to bring 
about that crisis. 
A CDS is a contract under which a “protection buyer” agrees to 
make payments, the “premium,” to a “protection seller” in exchange 
for a larger lump-sum payment if a third-party borrower, known as a 
“reference entity,” defaults on its obligation, the “reference 
obligation.”6 The CDS identifies a “notional amount” of the reference 
obligation covered, upon which the reciprocal payments are computed, 
and the duration for which the coverage will last, usually five years.7 
In a hypothetical example, suppose hedge fund A agrees to pay 
insurance company B a $2.50 (2.5%) per year premium on a $100 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., John Grgurich, Credit Default Swaps: Still Here, Still Able to Wreak 
Havoc, DAILY FINANCE (May 11, 2012), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/05
/11/jpmorgan-credit-default-swaps-still-wreaking-havoc/. 
2 See, e.g., Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the World, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 
2009, at 98, 98–99. 
3 See, e.g., Gary Weiss, The Man Who Made Too Much, UPSTART BUS. J. (Jan. 7, 
2009, 8:00 AM), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/executives/features/2009/01/07/
John-Paulson-Profits-in-Downturn.html. 
4 I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. 168. 
5 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684 (Sept. 16, 2011) (proposing to 
treat CDSs as notional principal contracts under I.R.C. § 1256(b)(2)(B)). 
6 Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#26 (last visited Sept. 
22, 2012), cited in Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Credit Derivatives 3, (Univ. 
of Fla. Col. Of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2009-39), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1509681. 
7 Lokken, supra note 6, at 3–4. 
C
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notional amount of a debt owed by investment bank C to lender D, and 
if C defaults on that debt, B agrees to pay A $100. C and D are not 
parties to the CDS transaction or even necessarily aware of the CDS 
transaction. 
In a real life example, on October 21, 2008, a notional amount of 
$360 billion in CDSs on reference obligations of a single borrower, 
Lehman Brothers, came home to roost.8 One CDS on Lehman Brothers 
debt was bought by a hedge fund for $22 million and is said to have 
returned $1 billion to the buyer9—almost fifty to one—far in excess of 
the highest odds at a roulette table.10 Apparently, CDSs bought on 
Lehman Brothers debt and sold by American International Group, Inc. 
(“AIG”) triggered AIG’s financial collapse and the massive U.S. 
government bailout that followed.11 
As the CDS market developed, the total notional amount of CDSs 
far exceeded the amount of debt that could possibly go into default.12 
A small percentage of CDS buyers may actually have owned the 
reference obligation and had a legitimate financial risk to hedge; 
however, most CDS buyers had nothing at stake and were simply 
                                                 
8 See Kim A. Olsen, Pay-up Time for Lehman Swaps, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 
22, 2008), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/JJ22Dj03.html; see 
also Louise Armitstead & Peter Koenig, Market Holds Breath as $360bn 
Lehman Swaps Unwind, THE TELEGRAPH (UK), Oct. 18, 2008, http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3224615/Markets-hold-breath-as-360bn-
Lehman-swaps-unwind.html. 
9 See Weiss, supra note 3. 
10 CATALIN BARBOIANU, ROULETTE ODDS AND PROFITS: THE MATHEMATICS OF 
COMPLEX BETS 20 (2007) (demonstrating that the highest pay out on a roulette 
wheel, from “the straight up” bet, is thirty-five to one and that the odds of 
winning the straight up bet are thirty-seven to one). 
11 See Lokken, supra note 6, at 1–2. See generally, MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG 
SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010), for a fascinating and highly 
readable explanation of how the massive growth in CDSs helped to fuel the U.S. 
real estate mortgage bubble, the popping of which in 2008 sent the world 
financial markets into collapse and the world economy into recession. 
12 See Gretchen Morgenson, Arcane Market is Next to Face Big Credit Test, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17
/business/17swap.html (“Since 2000, [the CDS market] has ballooned from 
$900 billion to more than $45.5 trillion—roughly twice the size of the entire 
United States stock market.”); see also Lokken, supra note 6, at 2 (estimating 
that the notional amounts of outstanding CDSs exceeded $60 trillion at the end 
of 2007). 
140 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 136 
piling on side bets, so-called “Naked CDSs,” hoping to profit 
vicariously from the random misfortune of a stranger.13 
The 2004 IRS Notice indicates that a variety of taxation theories 
for CDSs had been advanced by analogy to exotic financial devices.14 
According to the Notice, “analogies for a CDS include a derivative 
financial instrument such as a contingent option or notional principal 
contract, a financial guarantee or standby letter of credit, and an 
insurance contract.”15 More recently, certain academics have argued 
that, for tax purposes, CDSs do not fit correctly into any of those 
classifications. One author, for example, has argued that CDSs belong 
in his own newly-invented classification, “annuity-paid deep out-of-
the-money derivative contracts.”16 Another has argued that taxation of 
CDSs should be addressed with new legislation.17 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Richard Beales, Uncertain Road Ahead for Delphi, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2005, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f6a5d3e4-4fb6-11da-8b72-
0000779e2340.html (noting that when Delphi, General Motors’ parts supplier, 
went bankrupt in 2005, “the notional amount of credit derivatives referencing 
the company was more than 10 times the $2 [billion] or so of bonds 
outstanding”); see also Lokken, supra note 6, at 4–5 (discussing how the 
industry was forced to migrate from its original standard form swap contracts, 
which contemplated the physical delivery of the actual reference obligation by 
the protection buyer to the protection seller, to forms that provided either for 
settlement in cash, optionally or exclusively, whereby the protection seller 
simply writes a check if the obligation defaults, but nothing is transferred by the 
protection buyer in return). 
14 See I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. 168, 168–169. 
15 Id. 
16 See Ari J. Brandes, A Better Way to Understand the Speculative Use of Credit 
Default Swaps, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 263, 263–267 (2009). 
17 See Lokken, supra note 6, at 14–15 (“A solution that might ultimately become 
the best alternative—marking credit default swaps to market . . . . [But a] mark-
to-market regime for credit default swaps could only be instituted by a statutory 
change”). Professor Lokken’s proposal appears to have been rejected, at least 
insofar as Congress in 2010 amended I.R.C. § 1256(b) expressly to exclude 
credit default swaps from its mark-to-market provisions. Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 1601(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1256(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 
2011)). Under proposed regulations, CDSs would be taxed instead as “notional 
principal contracts.” Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684–85 (Sept. 16, 
2011). 
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It is often said, however, that the simplest explanation is usually 
the right one.18 Whether some exotic analogy is necessary to 
understand how to tax a CDS where the buyer actually has a legitimate 
financial risk to hedge,19 the simple explanation as to a Naked CDS is 
that it is gambling. “A person engages in gambling when he stakes or 
risks something of value upon the outcome of a contest of chance or a 
future contingent event not under his control or influence, upon an 
agreement or understanding that he will receive something of value in 
the event of a certain outcome.”20 Naked CDSs should be taxed the 
same way as any other gambling. 
This is not the radical suggestion it might seem.21 In fact, Congress 
confirmed that certain derivatives, including CDSs, constitute 
                                                 
18 See R. H. Helmholz, Ockham’s Razor in American Law, 21 TUL. EUR. & CIV. 
L.F. 109, 110–11 (2006) (“[C]omplicated explanations of observed phenomena 
should not ordinarily be accepted without proof of their necessity. Simpler 
explanations are to be preferred.”) (citing Pluralitas non est ponenda sine 
necessitate, Ordinatio I, d. 30 q. 2, in 4 WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, OPERA 
THEOLOGICA 322 (G.I. Etzkorn & Francis Kelly eds., 1979)). 
19 The scope of the IRS Notice is not limited to Naked CDSs, and it recognizes that 
“[a] relevant factor [in the consideration of analogs] may be how much of the 
CDS protection-buying market consists of persons who do not have or expect to 
be exposed to credit risk.” I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. at 169. For tax 
purposes, the difference between hedging transactions and those entered into for 
speculation is well recognized. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(f)(2)(v) (1994) 
(setting out specific rules for transactions “entered into primarily to reduce risk 
with respect to a specific debt instrument or group of debt instruments held or 
issued by the taxpayer”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(b)(1)–(3) (2007) (specifying 
different tax treatment for hedging and non-hedging transactions and defining 
the former as “any transaction that a taxpayer enters into in the normal course of 
the taxpayer’s trade or business primarily—(1) to manage risk of price changes 
or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property . . . that is held or to 
be held by the taxpayer, (2) to manage risk of interest rate or price changes or 
currency fluctuations with respect to borrowings made or to be made, or 
ordinary obligations incurred or to be incurred, by the taxpayer, or (3) to manage 
such other risks as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations . . . .”). 
20 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (McKinney 2012). 
21 See Mark Sunshine, “Stupid is as Stupid Does”, THE SUNSHINE REP. (Dec. 27, 
2008), http://www.thesunshinereport.net/marksunshine/?p=223 (“[W]hen the 
speculator doesn’t have an underlying economic interest . . . it’s high stakes 
gambling at its best.”); Jane Hamsher, Geitner Endorses Naked Credit Default 
Swaps, FIREDOGLAKE.COM (Mar. 26, 2009, 9:35 AM), 
http://firedoglake.com/2009/03/26/geithner-endorses-naked-credit-default-
swaps/ (quoting Dean Baker in reference to naked CDSs: “We tax gambling in 
Las Vegas”); DEAN BAKER, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., THE BENEFITS OF 
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gambling when in 2000, to allay industry fears that CDSs were illegal 
gambling,22 it exempted them from “any State or local law that 
prohibits or regulates gaming.”23 While the exemption decriminalized 
Naked CDSs,24 it made no change to their tax status. 
By contrast, the proposed regulations incorrectly categorize every 
CDS as a “notional principal contract” (NPC), a kind of financial 
instrument entitled to special, highly favorable capital asset tax 
treatment.25 That categorization is a product of rogue agency action; 
Congress never authorized this for Naked CDSs.26 
The proposed regulations would provide a massive tax windfall to 
some of the nation’s wealthiest taxpayers,27 at a time when the 
                                                                                                                   
A FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS TAX 3 (2008) (arguing in favor of a tax on 
financial speculation and noting that taxing transactions that are most 
comparable to gambling could result in their cessation). But see Kristin N. 
Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 
U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 197–98 (2011) (arguing against the application of 
gambling as an analogy to CDSs). 
22 See, e.g., Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: 
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 81 (2008) (statement of 
Eric Dinallo, Superintendent of New York State Ins. Dept.) (“With the growth 
of various kinds of derivatives in the late 20th Century, there was legal 
uncertainty as to whether certain derivatives, including credit default swaps, 
violated state bucket shop and gambling laws. [The Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000] created a ‘safe harbor’ by . . . preempting state and 
local gaming and bucket shop laws . . . .”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2000), 
amended by Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, sec. 117, Pub. L. 
No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763. 
23 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2006). 
24 Id. It remains unlawful to buy insurance on the life of a stranger. See, e.g., N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 3205(b)(2) (McKinney 2012). That is, at least, until the day an 
enterprising financial professional similarly persuades Congress to legalize 
“health default swaps.” 
25 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684, 57685–86. (Sept. 16, 2011). 
26 See Lokken, supra note 6, at 14. 
27 See Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Time for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/business/economy
/28gret.html (“United States commercial banks . . . held $13 trillion in notional 
value of credit derivatives at the end of the third quarter [of 2009], according to 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The biggest players in this world 
are JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America and Goldman Sachs.”). 
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government doesn’t have a nickel to spare.28 Meanwhile, the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, Warren Buffett, and the typical American 
wage earner are already outraged that “the 1%” pays taxes at a much 
lower rate than “the 99%.”29 The difference to the U.S. Treasury 
between tax-advantaged financial instruments and the less friendly 
treatment of gambling, which reflects the predictable divide between 
how the moneyed and non-moneyed classes are taxed, is very 
significant, potentially involving hundreds of billions of dollars of lost 
tax revenue if Naked CDSs are misclassified. 
After the introduction in Part I, this article argues in Part II that 
Naked CDSs constitute gambling wagers, not financial instruments. 
Part III discusses the current tax treatment of gambling and how it 
should apply to Naked CDSs. Throughout Part III, comparisons are 
drawn between gambling wagers and Naked CDSs to illustrate the 
implications that would follow from the federal treatment proposed in 
this article. These implications include the federal excise tax of up to 
2% on wagers,30 the treatment of profits on wagers as ordinary income 
rather than capital gains, 31 the 2.9% Medicare tax imposed on income 
earned from a trade or business,32 and the limitations on deductions for 
gambling losses.33 Since gambling income is taxable in the jurisdiction 
in which bets are placed rather than in the jurisdiction in which the 
taxpayer resides, like capital gains, there are also significant state 
income tax and foreign withholding tax implications that are discussed 
in Part III.34 
                                                 
28 See Jackie Calmes, Geithner Asks Congress to Raise U.S. Debt Limit Quickly, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/business
/economy/07debt.html. 
29 See, e.g., James Kwak, Occupy Wall Street’s Top Priority Should Be to Kill the 
Bush Tax Cuts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 17, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com
/business/archive/2011/10/occupy-wall-streets-top-priority-should-be-to-kill-
the-bush-tax-cuts/246817/; Steve Jordan, Warren Watch: Buffett Tax Idea 
Moves Omaha Native, OMAHA.COM (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.omaha.com
/article/20111009/MONEY/710099929; Sarah Dutton, Polls Show Longtime 
Support for Tax Hikes on Rich, CBS NEWS (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:16 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20119267-503544/polls-show-
longtime-support-for-tax-hikes-on-rich/. 
30 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
31 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
32 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
33 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
34 See discussion infra Part III.E. 
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While “taxpayers and industry groups” might find it a nasty 
surprise to have Naked CDSs taxed as gambling,35 in view of the cost 
to the U.S. Treasury of bailing out the financial system from a collapse 
caused at least in part by Naked CDSs,36 it seems only appropriate that 
those transactions and the very large profits made thereon be taxed for 
what they are.37 
 
II. A NAKED CDS IS GAMBLING 
The regulations proposed in 201138 arises from a classic flaw in 
logic. In 2010, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code (the 
Code) to add CDSs to a list of transactions that are not so-called 
§ 1256 contracts.39 The IRS concluded that by this action Congress 
intended also to add CDSs to a similar list of what are NPCs.40 If not 
                                                 
35 The imposition of taxes coming as a nasty surprise to a large class of taxpayers 
who thought they were just doing what everybody else was doing is not at all 
unprecedented. For example, see I.R.S. Treas. Dir. 04-0407-036, IRM 4.51.5 
(June 15, 2007), which discusses hundreds of U.S. corporations issuing 
thousands of what they claimed were “incentive stock options” with very 
favorable deferred tax treatment, before it was determined that the options had 
all been cleverly backdated to place them immediately in the money, and thus 
were immediately taxable. There were so many option holders who had not 
timely paid the tax on the options before that party ended that the IRS had to 
designate the matter an “LMSB Tier I issue” (Large and Mid-Size Business 
Division) and establish a formal program to administer the retroactive tax 
collections. See id. 
36 See Richard Simon & Nicole Gaouette, Approval of Bailout Comes Amid Signs 
That a Steep Recession is Just Beginning, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/04/business/fi-bailout4/2. 
37 This is not to suggest that any wrongdoing is afoot. In fact, during the seven 
year absence of requested guidance from the IRS, whatever reporting position a 
taxpayer may have taken with respect to Naked CDS transactions may be 
perfectly reasonable, even if it is ultimately determined on audit not to be the 
correct one. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (2003). 
38 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684 (Sept. 16, 2011). 
39 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 1601(a), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. 
§ 1256(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011)). 
40 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. at 57684–85 (“Congress incorporated 
into section 1256(b)(2)(B) a list of swaps that parallels the list of swaps included 
under the definition of a notional principal contract in § 1.446-3(c) with the 
addition of credit default swaps. The parallel language suggests that Congress 
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A, then B, is a propositional fallacy; it presumes that there is only one 
alternative to A, which is not the case.41 In fact, the term “notional 
principal contract” is entirely an invention not of Congress, but of the 
IRS in its regulations.42 The term does not appear in the § 1256 
amendment or, for that matter, anywhere else in the Code. In the 
§ 1256 amendment, Congress only said what a CDS is not, never what 
it is. As the Conference Report to the amendment stated, “The title 
contains a provision to address the recharacterization of income as a 
result of increased exchange-trading of derivatives by clarifying that 
section 1256 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to certain 
derivatives contracts transacted on exchanges.”43 
Section 1256 contracts are taxed at a hybrid 40% short-term, 60% 
long-term capital gains rate.44 The intent of the § 1256 amendment was 
to deny this lower capital gains rate to CDSs.45 Under the IRS 
regulations on NPCs, a premium payment is taxable as ordinary 
income to the protection seller, but a reciprocal payment made on the 
termination or assignment of an NPC, which is what normally happens 
when a default occurs under a CDS, is taxable to the protection buyer 
as capital gain.46 If the premium was paid more than one year earlier, 
the reciprocal payment is taxed as long-term capital gain.47 As the 
proposed regulations pertain to Naked CDSs, their effect would thus 
be the exact opposite of what Congress intended. Treating a Naked 
CDS as an NPC disregards the Congressionally recognized 
                                                                                                                   
was attempting to harmonize the category of swaps excluded under section 
1256(b)(2)(B) with swaps that qualify as notional principal contracts under 
§ 1.446-3(c) . . . .”). 
41 See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 316–17 (Robert Audi ed., 2d 
ed. 1999) (defining formal fallacy). 
42 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (1994) (defining notional principal contracts). 
43 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. at 57685 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, 
at 879 (2010) (Conf. Rep.)) (emphasis added). 
44 See I.R.C. § 1256(a)(3) (2006). 
45 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
sec. 1601(a)(2)(B), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 1256(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2011)). 
46 See Lokken, supra note 6, at 28–29 (recommending against treating a CDS as a 
NPC because capital asset treatment on a sale or termination of a NPC lets the 
buyer take an ordinary deduction on CDSs that do not pay off and selectively 
realize capital gain on the ones that do). 
47 I.R.C. § 1222 (2006) (defining long-term capital gain). 
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characterization of Naked CDSs as gambling.48 Moreover, this 
treatment affirmatively enables the “recharacterization” of the ordinary 
income from a winning Naked CDS bet into capital gain, something 
Congress expressly sought to prevent.49 
An NPC is “a financial instrument that provides for the payment of 
amounts by one party to another at specified intervals calculated by 
reference to a specified index upon a notional principal amount in 
exchange for specified consideration or a promise to pay similar 
amounts.”50 A typical NPC would be something like an interest rate 
swap, where a party paying interest on a floating interest rate loan gets 
rate protection by finding a third party who will take monthly 
payments at a fixed rate in exchange for making monthly payments at 
the floating rate. 
By contrast, with a Naked CDS, a party makes one or more small 
payments in exchange for a huge payment if a financial instrument he 
does not own goes into default.51 This is indistinguishable from 
gambling. It is no different from any other bet placed in exchange for a 
payback upon “a future contingent event not under [the bettor’s] 
control or influence.”52 
A fifty-to-one jackpot on a Naked CDS hardly involves the 
“similar amounts” contemplated by the NPC definition.53 Moreover, 
the key term, which may be appropriate for a CDS hedging a 
legitimate financial risk, is “financial instrument.”54 If that key term is 
ignored, and attention is given only to reciprocal payment obligations 
rather than the substance of the transaction, the rest of the NPC 
definition equally describes not only a Naked CDS, but also a lottery 
ticket or a World Series bet.55 Would anyone, except perhaps an 
                                                 
48 See 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2006). 
49 See Lokken, supra note 6, at 19; Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1601(a). 
50 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (1994) (emphasis added). 
51 See Lokken, supra note 6, at 8. 
52 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (McKinney 2012). 
53 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (1994). 
54 See id. 
55 To qualify, the lottery ticket or World Series bet would technically have to be 
paid for in at least two installments. This is because the proposed regulations 
include a “new ‘two-payment rule’ for delineating between Section 1256 
contracts, such as futures and foreign currency contracts, and notional principal 
contracts.” See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3, 76 F.R. 57684, 57687 (Sept. 16, 
2011); see also N.Y. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON PROPOSED AND TEMPORARY 
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investment banker on the receiving end of a large payout, have the 
audacity to suggest that those latter items are also “financial 
instruments” deserving capital gain treatment rather than ordinary 
income treatment?56 As the Supreme Court observed in a leading 
income tax case involving a professional gambler, “[a] test that 
everyone passes is not a test at all.”57 
What is it that singles out a Naked CDS from every other garden-
variety bet for celebration as a “financial instrument”? That it is made 
on an institutional “trading desk,”58 rather than in a back alley? That it 
is written on an International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
form,59 rather than a bookie’s notepad? That it looks to the outcome of 
                                                                                                                   
REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 871(M), 34–35 (Apr. 25, 2012) (discussing the 
“two-payment rule” in the context of tax treatment of accrual amounts). 
56 See generally Luc Sante, Goldman: All Con, No Artist, POLITICO (Apr. 26, 2010, 
11:07 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/36369.html (suggesting 
that the creation and sale of “booby-trapped” wagers by boastful investment 
bankers constitutes a confidence game). 
57 Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 34 (1987). 
58 See Philip R. Cleary, Predicting the Taxation of Prediction Markets, 27 VA. 
TAX REV. 953, 956–57 (2008) (noting that transactions, including bets on 
presidential elections, that “might strike many tax professionals as gambling” 
can now be effected through so-called “prediction markets”). Attorney Cleary 
argues that something new and exciting that everyone is doing by a different 
name shouldn’t be gambling, even if that’s what an old-fashioned Code section 
expressly calls it, saying “[i]t is hard to imagine classifying prediction 
derivatives as gambling for income tax purposes merely because gambling for 
purposes of an excise tax written in 1954 includes wagering pools based on 
election outcomes.” Id. at 980. He concedes, however, that the IRS has stated 
that it sees “no reason why the income tax meaning of a wager should differ 
from the explanation put forth in the Regulations under the excise tax,” and that 
“if some or all prediction markets are a form of gambling, then there are 
relatively severe tax consequences.” Id. at 978, 980. See also Stephen Zorn, 
Federal Tax Treatment of Gambling: Fairness or Obsolete Moralism?, 49 TAX 
LAW. 1, 1–2 (1995) (arguing that gambling has become so widespread and 
accepted that it should no longer be taxed disadvantageously). 
59 See An Introduction to the Documentation of OTC Derivatives, ALLEN & 
OVERY, at 3–4 (May 2002), http://www.isda.org/educat/pdf/documentation
_of_derivatives.pdf. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(“ISDA”) defines “credit derivative” as “a privately negotiated agreement that 
explicitly shifts credit risk from one party to the other.” ISDA, supra note 6. The 
ISDA defines “credit default swap” as “a credit derivative contract in which one 
party (protection buyer) pays an [sic] periodic fee to another party (protection 
seller) in return for compensation for default (or similar credit event) by a 
reference entity.” Id. In the case of a Naked CDS, there is, by definition, no risk 
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a random event involving a corporate security rather than perhaps a 
roll of the dice or the pull of a slot machine handle?60 
The Wall Street figures who achieved great success buying Naked 
CDSs no doubt studied hard and worked with great ingenuity to 
improve their odds.61 But so do the people pouring over the Daily 
Racing Form looking for long shots at the track. A recent article in 
Harper’s Magazine discusses the remarkable “luck” of a Texas 
scratch-ticket lottery player who won three jackpots of more than a 
million dollars each during the last decade.62 The odds of doing this by 
random selection are astronomical. The article speculates that the 
winner, a sixty-three-year-old, Stanford University-educated math 
professor, who specialized in statistics, might have discovered an 
angle.63 But nobody would argue that her lottery winnings were 
perhaps instead a tax-exempt stipend for academic research.64 The fact 
that a particular player can improve her gambling odds through 
personal effort and skill does not alter the fact that she is gambling.65 
An IRS spokesperson with responsibility for the proposed 
regulations stated to this author that while all derivatives could be 
looked at as gambling to some degree, the IRS would not tax them as 
such without express congressional action.66 However, this view 
misses the point that Congress has acted. By preempting the 
application of state gaming laws on certain derivatives, Congress 
                                                                                                                   
to shift from the buyer, so a Naked CDS does not fall within the ISDA definition 
of credit derivative. 
60 See Treas. Reg. § 44.4421-1(b)(1) (2008) (including within the definition of 
“lottery” numbers games in which the winning numbers are published in 
“United States Treasury balance reports, or the reports of a stock or commodity 
exchange”). 
61 See Weiss, supra note 3 (discussing how one hedge fund carefully selected those 
reference obligations which were most likely to default); see also LEWIS, supra 
note 11, at 202 (describing a credit default swap devised by Morgan Stanley 
trader Mike Edman that, through the use of “some fine print,” provided the 
buyer with the equivalent of “flood insurance that, if a drop of water so much as 
grazed any part of the house, paid them the value of the entire house”). 
62 Nathaniel Rich, The Luckiest Woman on Earth: Three Ways to Win the Lottery, 
HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 2011, at 58, 62–63. 
63 Id. at 58. 
64 See I.R.S. Pub. 970, at 6 (2011). 
65 See Baxter v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 912, 917 (D. Nev. 1986) (recognizing 
a distinction between active and passive gambling in relation to the tax code). 
66 Telephone interview with K. Scott Brown, I.R.S. Spokesperson (Jan. 30, 2012). 
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recognized that at least some derivatives are gambling, not financial 
instruments.67 Despite this recognition, Congress did not act to 
recharacterize income from any derivatives, let alone income from 
whichever ones Congress was protecting from state gambling laws. 
A “short seller” of stock may not own the stock on the date of the 
short sale, but the short seller typically has borrowed it.68 And because 
short sales only account for a tiny fraction of the overall market,69 they 
can be covered, or physically delivered upon,70 if necessary, even by a 
naked short seller. Certain other kinds of swaps, such as those on 
interest rates or equity indexes, may also be “naked” in some respects, 
but they are surrogates for securities that could be bought in the 
market.71 By contrast, there is typically an insufficient supply of 
reference obligations to enable most Naked CDS buyers to cover,72 
and often the terms of a Naked CDS do not contemplate or even 
permit physical delivery.73 
                                                 
67 See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
68 See Short Selling Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/s/shortselling.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (“The selling of a security 
that the seller does not own, or any sale that is completed by the delivery of a 
security borrowed by the seller.”). 
69 See, e.g., Press Release, New York Stock Exchange Euronext, NYSE Group Inc. 
Issues Short Interest Report (July 12, 2011) (http://www.nyse.com/press
/1310464193322.html) (stating that in the year ending June 30, 2011, monthly 
short interest on the New York Stock Exchange averaged less than 4% of total 
shares outstanding). 
70 See Physical Delivery Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com
/terms/p/physicaldelivery.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (“Term in an options 
or futures contract which requires the actual underlying asset to be delivered 
upon the specified delivery date, rather than being traded out with offsetting 
contracts.”). 
71 See Kevin Dolan & Carolyn DuPuy, Equity Derivatives: Principles and 
Practice, 15 VA. TAX REV. 161, 164 (1995) (describing equity derivatives). 
72 See Lewis, supra note 11, at 28–29 (“The bonds were impossible to sell short. 
To sell a stock or bond short, you needed to borrow it, and these tranches of 
mortgage bonds were tiny and impossible to find. You could buy them or not 
buy them, but you couldn’t bet explicitly against them . . . .”). 
73 See Lokken, supra note 6, at 4, 5 n.17 (suggesting that multiple Naked CDSs on 
a single reference obligation could in theory physically settle one by one, with 
the same reference obligation transferred repeatedly through successive 
transactions, but conceding this would likely result in market chaos even if 
physical settlement was allowed in the contract). 
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And, most importantly, by far, from the buyer’s standpoint, a 
Naked CDS is uniquely not a surrogate for any actual security.74 The 
buyer of a Naked CDS has no relationship with the reference entity, no 
interest in the reference obligation, no control over the default event, 
and no risk to guard against.75 The buyer of a Naked CDS is not 
investing for market appreciation of an asset over time, the sine qua 
non of a capital asset.76 The “buyer” is not actually buying anything at 
all; the buyer is not even trying to mimic the market appreciation of an 
asset that could be bought. Rather, the Naked CDS buyer is betting 
that a future event not under his control will come along and destroy 
the value of someone else’s capital asset. The reference obligation is 
the last thing the Naked CDS buyer would want to invest in.77 
It may very well be that “covered” CDSs, where the buyer is 
actually at risk on an underlying bond or other financial instrument, 
are themselves properly characterized as some kind of financial 
instrument for tax purposes, but there is simply nothing “financial” 
about a Naked CDS.78 To the holder of a Naked CDS, the reference 
obligation has no economic significance and is a complete 
abstraction.79 
If a Naked CDS is not the derivative that required preemption from 
state gambling laws, it is hard to imagine the transaction more 
                                                 
74 See Lokken, supra note 6 at 8; Johnson, supra note 24, at 197 (“[I]nnovators 
created a credit default swap agreement that did not require the protection buyer 
to own the reference asset mentioned in the credit default swap agreement. 
Market participants describe these agreements as ‘uncovered’ . . . or naked 
credit default swaps”). 
75 See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, A Daring Trade Has Wall Street Seething, WALL 
ST. J., June 11, 2009, at C1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB124468148614104619.html (discussing bets of $130 million made by J.P. 
Morgan, Royal Bank of Scotland Securities, Bank of America, and others on the 
performance of around $27 million in securities issued by Lehman Brothers in 
2005 where the Texas protection seller who took the bets cleverly bought up all 
the particular bonds in question, ensuring that no default would occur). 
76 See infra Part III.B. 
77 See Sunshine, supra note 24. 
78 The IRS has suggested that Naked CDSs serve a useful function, providing 
“liquidity” in the marketplace. Brown, supra note 66. Whether true, however, it 
is irrelevant to how Congress intends them to be taxed. 
79 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 11, at 77 (“The original home mortgage loans on 
whose fate both sides were betting played no role. In a funny way, they existed 
only so that their fate might be gambled upon.”). 
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distanced from legitimate financial activity that Congress had in mind 
when it enacted the preemption.80 
III. A NAKED CDS IS TAXABLE JUST LIKE ANY OTHER GAMBLING 
While the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
“legalized” Naked CDSs under state gaming laws,81 it did nothing to 
suggest that Naked CDSs should be treated differently for tax purposes 
than any other form of gambling under either federal or state law.82 
Taxing Naked CDSs as gambling has a number of significant tax 
implications. 
A. Federal Excise Tax on Wagers 
Wagers accepted in states where wagers are not authorized by state 
law, such as New York, are subject to a 2% federal excise tax.83 In 
states where wagers are legal, a 0.25% federal excise tax applies.84 “A 
person is engaged in the business of accepting wagers if he makes it a 
practice to accept wagers with respect to which he assumes the risk of 
profit or loss depending on the outcome of the event or the contest 
with respect to which the wager is accepted.”85 It is not necessary that 
“a person must be either so engaged to the exclusion of all other 
activities or even primarily so engaged.”86 
                                                 
80 Cf., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring) (“I 
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description . . . . But I know it when I see 
it . . . .”). 
81 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2) (2000), amended by Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000, sec. 117, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763. 
82 In determining that the I.R.C. § 4401 wagering excise tax applies to wagering 
that itself had been authorized by federal law on an Indian reservation, the 
Supreme Court specifically cited the interpretive canon “that warns us against 
interpreting federal statutes as providing tax exemptions unless those 
exemptions are clearly expressed.” Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 
84, 95 (2001). 
83 I.R.C. § 4401(a)(2) (2006). New York law prohibits wagers, so wagers there are 
subject to the 2% federal excise tax. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00 (McKinney 
2011). 
84 I.R.C. § 4401(a)(1) (2006). 
85 Treas. Reg. § 44.4401-2 (b) (2008). 
86 Id. 
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“The amount of the wager is the amount risked by the bettor . . . 
[not] the amount which he stands to win.”87 In the case of a Naked 
CDS, the wager would thus be the premium, the periodic payments 
paid for the Naked CDS by the protection buyer to the protection 
seller, not the entire notional amount.88 
The excise tax must be paid even if the person initially accepting 
wagers “lays off all or part of the wagers placed with him with another 
person.”89 Thus, the tax would be paid even when the person accepting 
the wager hedges the Naked CDS sold with a Naked CDS purchased 
from a different protection seller. However, the person initially 
accepting a wager may apply for a refund if the lay-off is to another 
person subject to the excise tax who certifies that he will pay the tax.90 
Notably, the wagering excise tax is a joint and several obligation of 
both the entity accepting the wager and the individual accepting the 
wager on behalf of the entity, for example, an individual employee on 
a trading desk, unless that individual has previously personally 
registered with the IRS as a wager taker.91 
Consider this proposed tax treatment in the context of a real 
example. According to The Securities and Exchange Commission 
2010 securities fraud complaint (the “SEC Complaint”) against 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) and Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman 
Vice President in charge of its “structured product correlation trading 
desk,” the Goldman office in New York sold a Naked CDS to hedge 
fund Paulson & Co. (“Paulson”).92 If the Naked CDS is considered a 
wager, then Paulson’s premium payments to Goldman would be 
subject to a 2% excise tax.93 Payment of that excise tax would be a 
joint and several liability of Goldman and any individual Goldman 
employee who accepted the wager on behalf of Goldman unless the 
individual was himself personally registered as a wager taker.94 
                                                 
87 Treas. Reg. § 44.4401-1 (b)(2)(i) (2008). 
88 See Lokken, supra note 6 at 3. 
89 Treas. Reg. § 44.4401-2(c) (2008). 
90 Id. at § 44.6419-2(b) 
91 I.R.C. § 4401(c) (2006). 
92 Complaint at 2, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (No. 1:10CV03229) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
93 See I.R.C. § 4401(a)(2) (2006). 
94 Id. § 4401(c) (2006). 
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Following along with the analysis, Goldman would be said to have 
laid off the bet it made with Paulson by buying matching Naked CDSs 
from ACA Capital Holdings, Inc. and ABN AMRO Bank N.V. for a 
total of sixty-seven basis points (0.67%) per year.95 The SEC 
Complaint doesn’t state what Goldman charged Paulson for the Naked 
CDSs it sold, but if Goldman were, for example, collecting 250 basis 
points (2.50%) from Paulson on the notional amount of Naked CDSs it 
sold,96 and paying only sixty-seven basis points (0.67%) on an 
equivalent notional amount of Naked CDSs it bought, it would thereby 
have laid off the entire bet, while netting almost three quarters, 183 
basis points (1.83%), of the amount wagered for itself. 
If the notional amount of the Naked CDSs sold to Paulson were $1 
billion, as suggested by what Paulson eventually collected on its bet,97 
the amount of the wager at 2.5% would have been $25 million per 
year, and a 2% excise tax on that would be $500,000 per year. 
While the entire $500,000 excise tax would have to be paid each 
year by Goldman (or by an unregistered individual wager taker who 
accepted the Naked CDS on Goldman’s behalf), Goldman (or such 
individual) would be entitled to apply for a refund to the extent that the 
entities to which Goldman laid off the bet certified they would pay it; 
that is, the net liability could be less if ACA and ABN AMRO took 
responsibility for the excise tax on the portions laid off.98 However, 
wagers are only subject to the excise tax if they have sufficient U.S. 
ties.99 So, if the lay-off to ABN AMRO, a large foreign bank, were 
accepted off-shore, it would not appear to be subject to the excise tax 
and able to give rise to a refund to Goldman.100 
Extrapolating the proposed tax treatment from this single $1 billion 
CDS transaction to a perhaps $60 trillion total CDS market, of which 
perhaps 80%,101 $48 trillion, is “naked,” an average premium of 2.5% 
                                                 
95 See Complaint, supra note 92, at 2. 
96 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 11, at 75–76 (providing an example of one Naked 
CDS sold by Goldman at a 2.5% premium, although this may not be 
representative). 
97 See id. at 237–38. 
98 See Treas. Reg. § 44.4401–2 (2008); Treas. Reg. § 44.6419-2(b) (2008). 
99 Treas. Reg. § 44.4404-1(a) (2008).  
100 See id. 
101 See Andrew Leonard, Credit Default Swaps: What Are They Good For?, 
SALON.COM, (Apr. 20, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.salon.com/2010/04/20
/naked_credit_default_swaps. 
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of the notional amount would represent a possible total of $1.2 trillion 
of wagers that could be subject to a 2% excise tax. That would 
generate a possible $24 billion per year in tax revenue. However, the 
actual number is difficult to estimate because an indeterminate but 
probably large portion of that $60 trillion total market may represent 
bets laid off multiple times, premiums vary depending on the 
perceived risk of default, and some portion of the market is 
offshore.102 But the number would nevertheless represent a large 
amount of tax revenue.103 
B. Ordinary Income, Not Capital Gain 
Gambling income is taxed as ordinary income.104 A wager is not a 
capital asset for tax purposes.105 This is so despite the broad “property 
held” language of the Code’s definition of capital asset and the 
absence of any express exclusion from that definition for wagers.106 In 
rejecting a taxpayer’s argument that the sale of a winning lottery ticket 
held by the taxpayer qualifies for capital gain treatment, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that Maginnis, the taxpayer: 
(1) did not make any underlying investment of capital in return for 
the receipt of his lottery right, and (2) the sale of his right did not 
reflect an accretion in value over cost to any underlying asset 
Maginnis held. 
. . . . 
Maginnis does not—and cannot—argue that the purchase of a 
lottery ticket is a “capital investment,” the return from which 
should be treated as a capital gain. . . . The lottery prize would 
have been taxed at ordinary income rates, reflecting the Revenue 
Code’s general position that gambling winnings are not treated as 
                                                 
102 Gerald P. Dwyer & Thomas Flavin, Credit Default Swaps on Government Debt: 
Mindless Speculation?, CENT. FOR FIN. INNOVATION & STABILITY (Sept. 2010), 
available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/cenfis/pubscf/nftv_0910.pdf 
(showing that CDSs premiums on debt issued by Greece skyrocketed as it faced 
default beginning as early as 2010). 
103 See I.R.C. § 4401(c) (2006). 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Watkins v. Comm’r, 447 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2006). But see Robida v. 
Comm’r, 460 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Gambling receipts have been 
considered . . . more clearly akin to return on capital . . . than earned 
compensation for services performed.”). 
105 See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1184; Watkins, 447 F.3d at 1273. 
106 See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1182; Watkins, 447 F.3d at 1271-72. 
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capital gains. Therefore, the purchase of a lottery ticket is no more 
an underlying investment of capital than is a dollar bet on the spin 
of a roulette wheel.107 
A Naked CDS fits squarely into the Ninth Circuit’s description of 
what is not a capital asset. There is no underlying investment of 
capital, no underlying asset held, just “a dollar bet on the spin of a 
roulette wheel.”108 Congress, by the § 1256 amendment, expressly 
denied CDSs even a hybrid 40%-short-term, 60%-long-term capital 
gains tax rate.109 Accordingly, and whether a Naked CDS wager “pays 
off” by settlement or termination payment from the protection seller or 
by a sale of the Naked CDSs to a third party, it must give rise to 
ordinary income, not capital gain.110 
Much has been made in the perennial debate over income tax 
reform of the need to change the law providing special tax treatment 
for so-called carried interests of hedge fund managers, under which a 
significant part of their compensation can come to them as a share of 
the long-term capital gains of the hedge fund, taxable at low long-term 
capital gains rates rather than much higher ordinary income rates, even 
though it is paid in exchange for their services.111 By contrast with a 
                                                 
107 Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183–84 (emphasis added). The Maginnis court based its 
holding largely on an earlier Supreme Court case that said that capital asset 
treatment would not be available “when there is no evidence of a sale of an 
underlying capital investment,” and the transaction is “‘manifestly not of the 
type which gives rise to the hardship of the realization in one year of an advance 
in value over cost built up in several years, which is what Congress sought to 
ameliorate by the capital-gains provisions.’” Id. at 1183 (quoting Comm’r v. 
Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 135 (1960)); accord Watkins, 447 
F.3d at 1272 (quoting Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958) 
(“capital gains treatment of the lump sum is inappropriate. This is so because the 
‘consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an 
increase in the value of income-producing property’”)). 
108 Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1184. 
109 I.R.C. § 1256(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
110 See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183. 
111 See Laura Saunders, ‘Carried Interest’ in the Crosshairs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190388560457648654176
1322496.html. A carried interest is a share of the profits of a partnership 
allocated to a partner that is disproportionately large relative to the partner’s 
contribution of capital to the partnership, typically in consideration of services 
provided by the partner. Id. The taxation of hedge fund managers’ carried 
interests has long been a contentious issue in tax reform discussions because, to 
the extent the profits so allocated consist of long-term capital gains, the partner, 
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fund manager’s share of true capital gains made by a hedge fund, 
however, a hedge fund manager’s carried interest allocation of 
gambling income must always be ordinary income, under existing 
law.112 
John Paulson, the named principal of the hedge fund involved in 
the Naked CDS transaction with Goldman that is the subject of the 
SEC Complaint, reportedly earned $3.7 billion in 2007 by predicting 
the downfall of Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, and 
certain other institutions: 
Since all that toxic waste on the balance sheet imperiled the 
survival of the banks, Paulson wanted to be sure he was prepared. 
So he bought credit default swaps, like the $22 million he bet 
against Lehman—essentially an insurance policy that paid off 
when Lehman’s bonds defaulted. Even though Paulson didn’t 
actually own any Lehman bonds, he made more than $1 billion on 
that bet. It’s as though he’d bought insurance policies on houses he 
didn’t own along the Indian Ocean just moments before the 
tsunami hit.113 
Mr. Paulson’s tax return is not in the public record, of course,114 so 
there is no way to know how he characterized income from Naked 
CDSs. But on a pay out of $3.7 billion, the difference between a 15% 
long-term capital gain tax and a 35% top bracket ordinary income tax 
is $740 million for that single year.115 And Mr. Paulson is not alone in 
                                                                                                                   
who could be earning millions or even billions of dollars a year, gets a paycheck 
exempt from payroll taxes and subject to only a 15% federal income tax rate. 
See Jenny Anderson, Scrutiny on Tax Rates That Fund Managers Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 13, 2007, at C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007
/06/13/business/13tax.html. 
112 See I.R.C. § 165 (2006); Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183. 
113 Weiss, supra note 3. The SEC Complaint notes that Paulson was actively 
involved in selecting the particularly vulnerable reference obligation portfolio as 
to which it bought the Naked CDSs from Goldman. See Complaint, supra note 
92, at 2–3, 25. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, one expert on structured 
finance observed, “[W]hen you buy protection against an event you have a hand 
in causing, you are buying fire insurance on someone else’s house and then 
committing arson.” Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled 
Mortgage Related Debt, Bet Against It and Won, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at 
B4. 
114 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2006). 
115 See I.R.S. Pub. 17 at 104, 115, 274 (2011). 
2013 Tax Naked CDSs for What They Are 157 
having made large profits on Naked CDSs.116 The Big Short recounts 
the stories of several different hedge funds and their managers that 
made tens to hundreds of millions of dollars on Naked CDSs,117 and 
great success by other hedge fund managers has also been reported.118 
The same potential 20% federal income tax rate differential would 
apply to Naked CDS income allocated by a hedge fund not only to its 
general partner-managers, but also to its limited partner-investors. In 
other words, the remaining typically 80% of the fund’s income not 
allocated as carried interest to the general partner would be reportable 
as ordinary income, not capital gain, by its limited partners.119 
C. Medicare Taxes 
Income earned through a trade or business, either directly or by 
allocation from a partnership, is generally considered net earnings 
from self-employment120 and subject to federal self-employment 
taxes.121 
Capital gains are excluded from the definition of net earnings from 
self-employment.122 Further, “[t]he character of any item of 
income . . . included in a partner’s distributive share . . . shall be 
determined as if such item were realized directly from the source from 
which realized by the partnership . . . .”123 As a result, even though 
                                                 
116 See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 105–06 (Whitebox, The Baupost Group, Passport 
Capital, Elm Ridge, Elliot Associates, Cedar Hill Capital Partners, QVT 
Financial, Hayman Capital, and Pennant Capital are among those listed by the 
author as having profited by betting against subprime mortgages). 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., Chris Serres, From Iron Range hockey hero to Wall Street star, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, July 6, 2008, available at http://www
.startribune.com/business/22949299.html (reporting that Philip Falcone of 
Harbinger Capital Partners, who bet against the housing market in 2006, bought 
hundreds of millions of dollars of CDSs that yielded $1.5 billion by the year’s 
end). 
119 See supra note 111. 
120 I.R.C. § 1402(a) (2006) (stating that a taxpayer’s net earnings from self-
employment include “gross income derived by an individual from any trade or 
business . . . plus his distributive share . . . of income or loss . . . from any trade 
or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a member . . . .”). 
121 Id. § 1401 (2006) (net earnings from self-employment are subject to self-
employment taxes). 
122 Id. § 1402(a)(3) (2006). 
123 Id. § 702(b) (2006). 
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managing an investment fund is a trade or business for tax purposes,124 
much of an investment fund manager’s income typically comes as an 
allocation of capital gains of the fund, which retains that character in 
the hands of the manager and does not typically bear self-employment 
taxes.125 
Gambling income, however, is not excluded from the definition of 
net earnings from self-employment.126 Accordingly, by contrast with 
an allocation of partnership capital gains, an allocation of Naked CDS 
winnings by a partnership to its general partner-manager would be 
subject to self-employment taxes.127 
Although the self-employment 12.4% Social Security tax only 
applies to the first approximately $100,000 of income, there is no limit 
to the applicability of the 2.9% Medicare tax.128 Thus, for example, if 
all of hedge fund manager John Paulson’s $3.7 billion of income in 
2007 were attributable to Naked CDS winnings taxed as gambling 
income, a Medicare tax on that amount would be more than $100 
million. 
D. Limitations on Use of Losses 
Gambling losses are deductible for federal tax purposes, but only 
to the extent of gambling income.129 Since a deduction in excess of 
gambling losses is not allowed, gambling losses also do not give rise 
to a net operating loss that can be carried back or forward.130 
Limiting the use of losses on Naked CDSs to same tax year profits 
on Naked CDSs could have significant implications for sellers who 
made large profits in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis 
and then incurred large losses in that single year.131 For example, 
                                                 
124 See Dagres v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 263, 283–85 (2011). 
125 See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(3) (2006); see also Anderson, supra note 111. 
126 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(2)–(5) (2006). 
127 Limited partner-investors are not, by contrast, engaged in a trade or business, so 
income allocated to them would not be subject to self-employment taxes, 
regardless of character. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (2006). 
128 I.R.S. Pub. 334, at 9 (2010). 
129 See I.R.C. §§ 162(a) (2006); id. § 165(d) (2006); see also Boyd v. United States, 
762 F.2d 1369, 1372–73 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A] gambling loss, although it may be 
a business expense, is deductible only to the extent of gambling gains.”). 
130 See I.R.C. § 172(c) (2006) (defining “net operating loss” as “the excess of the 
deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross income”). 
131 See Lokken, supra note 6 at 14. 
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Ambac Financial Group, Inc., the holding company for a now 
bankrupt CDS seller, recovered a reported $700 million of tax refunds 
for the years 2003–2008 by carrying back more than $3 billion of 
losses arising from its subsidiary’s CDS business in subsequent 
years.132 To the extent the later year losses were attributable to Naked 
CDSs, that carryback is improper and the refund by the U.S. Treasury 
should not have been paid.133 Given the size of the Naked CDS market 
and the massive losses resulting from the financial crisis, it is likely 
that Ambac is not an isolated case,134 and there is a good chance that a 
much larger amount of Naked CDS losses has been improperly carried 
back to shelter prior year income from the up to 35% federal income 
tax rate that should have applied. 
These limitations also have post-financial crisis relevance. For 
example, JP Morgan/Chase announced a disastrous loss, $2 billion and 
counting, on CDSs in 2012.135 To the extent these losses are 
attributable to Naked CDSs, they similarly should not be used to offset 
JP Morgan/Chase’s regular banking income in 2012 or carried back or 
forward to other years. 
E. State Income Taxes and Federal Withholding Taxes 
A detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this article, but it 
bears noting that gambling income characterization of Naked CDS 
profits also has state and cross-border tax implications. 
                                                 
132 See Tiffany Kary, Ambac Sues U.S., Seeks Shield for $700 Million Refund, 
(Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-09/ambac-sues-u-s-
seeks-shield-for-700-million-refund-update1-.html; see also Tiffany Kary, 
Ambac Financial Files Third Amended Plan of Reorganization, (Feb. 27, 2012) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-22/ambac-files-amended-
reorganization-plan-after-reaching-wisconsin-agreement.html. 
133 See I.R.C. § 172(c) (2006); see also I.R.S. Pub. 550, at 41 (2011) (discussing 
loss carryback election for NPCs). 
134 See Erika W. Nijenhuis, New Tax Issues Arising From the Dodd Frank Act and 
Related Changes to Market Practices for Derivatives, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 90–
91 (2011) (“When Ambac decided to[apply for carryback adjustments] . . . it did 
so on the basis of an opinion from one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms, 
KPMG.”). 
135 See Mary Childs & Shannon D. Harrington, JPMorgan Losses Spark Frenzy In 
Swaps Indexes: Credit Markets, Bloomberg.com (May 14, 2012, 9:09 AM), http
://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-14/jpmorgan-losses-spark-frenzy-in-
swaps-indexes-credit-markets.html. 
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Capital gains on intangibles such as investment securities are 
generally taxable in the jurisdiction of the taxpayer’s residence, 
without regard to where the gain may have been generated; for 
example, buying and selling stock through a broker in California does 
not create California taxable income for a non-resident.136 The 
aggregate capital gains of a partnership located in one state are 
allocated to individual partners who may reside in other states and may 
only be taxed on the gains there,137 and U.S.-derived capital gains of 
non-resident foreigners are generally not subject to U.S. taxes.138 
By contrast, the locus of gambling taxation is where the bet is 
accepted.139 Some states tax non-residents on in-state gambling 
income,140 some states do not.141 And some states, like New York, 
where a significant amount of the CDS market was centered, tax non-
resident gambling income only if it is sufficient to rise to the level of a 
trade or business.142 Thus, depending on the circumstances, some or all 
of the partners could be liable for state income tax on their distributive 
shares of a partnership’s Naked CDSs income in the state where the 
partnership’s Naked CDSs are accepted, without regard to where any 
of the individual partners live. And, while for federal purposes 
gambling winnings can be netted against gambling losses in the same 
tax year, some states tax gross gambling winnings and limit or deny 
entirely any gambling loss offset.143 
                                                 
136 State of Cal. Franchise Tax Board, FTB Pub. 1100, at 5 (2012), availible at 
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/misc/1100.pdf. 
137 David M. Halbfinger, Fund Managers’ Profits Are Ripe for a New Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A28, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/nyregion
/30hedge.html?_r=0 (discussing a New York proposal to tax the profits of 
nonresident hedge fund managers). 
138 I.R.C. § 871(a)(1), (b) (2006) (imposing a 30% tax on a litany of U.S. source 
income categories earned by non-resident aliens, but only on capital gains to the 
extent that the taxpayer is present in the United States for 183 or more days). 
139 See id. § 4401(a) (2006); see also id. § 4404(a)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg. 
§ 44.4421-1 (2008). 
140 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 270.17(2)(d) (West 2012) (“Income from winnings on a 
bet made by an individual while in Minnesota is assigned to this state”). 
141 See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Rev. Serv., IP 2011(27), at 2, available at http:
//www.ct.gov/drs/cwp/view.asp?A=1510&Q=493764. 
142 N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., Pub. 88, at 12, 15 (2010), available at http:
//www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/income/2010/pub88.pdf. 
143 See I.R.C. § 63(d) (2006); id. § 165(d) (2006); Mass. Dep’t. of Revenue, 
Directive 03-3, Factors For Determining When Gambling is a Trade or Business 
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Similarly, the Naked CDS winnings of a non-resident foreigner on 
Naked CDSs accepted in the United States could be subject either to 
income tax on a U.S. trade or business144 or to backup withholding,145 
and the foreign taxpayer’s right to offset losses against winnings could 
depend upon the presence and precise terms of a tax treaty between the 
United States and the foreign taxpayer’s jurisdiction of residence.146 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Insofar as Naked CDSs are concerned, the Proposed Regulations 
are inconsistent with existing tax law, and would erroneously reduce 
applicable tax rates on a massive volume of gambling transactions. A 
Naked CDS is not, and should not be taxed as an NPC. 
It should not come as a surprise to “taxpayers and industry groups” 
that Naked CDSs are taxable as gambling. Congress may in 2000 have 
made Naked CDSs legal gambling, but Congress never said Naked 
CDSs were also tax-advantaged gambling. The U.S. government has 
been driven deeply into debt as a result of a financial crisis precipitated 
at least in part by Naked CDSs. It can hardly afford not to aggressively 
                                                                                                                   
(2003), n. 1 (“For federal tax purposes, gambling losses may be deducted from 
adjusted gross income to the extent of gambling winnings, if the taxpayer 
itemizes his or her deductions. Massachusetts does not adopt this federal 
deduction.”); Busch v. Comm’r of Revenue 713 N.W.2d 337, 345 n.7 (Minn. 
2006) (“Minnesota incorporates the federal AMT calculation method, but 
changes it somewhat . . . . The effect of this approach is to use the federal AMT 
laws for calculating the gross income subject to the Minnesota AMT, but to 
apply Minnesota’s own curtailed list of itemized deductions . . . [which 
excluding gambling losses].”). 
144 See I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-2 C.B. 168, 169. The IRS Notice states that 
“insuring risks [from the CDS seller side, if a CDS were deemed to be 
insurance] from within the United States could constitute engaging in a trade or 
business within the United States,” but does not mention the possibility that 
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aliens are taxed at graduated rates on net gambling income won in the U.S. that 
is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business.” I.R.S. Pub. 515, at 27 
(2011). 
145 I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (2006) (imposing a 30% withholding tax on any “amount [of 
income] received from sources within the United States by a nonresident alien 
individual . . . not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business 
within the United States”). 
146 See Park v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 569, 575 (2011). 
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pursue tax collections from those who profited so handsomely while 
the game was on. 
